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PROPERTY IN OIL AND GAS*
W. L. SumERs
Professor of Law, University of Illinois
In determining the true nature of the rights of the owner of
land in the oil and gas beneath the surface, the courts have been
confronted with a problem of considerable difficulty. To say that
no sound principle regulating such rights has been determined
upon may be putting it too strongly, but it can be safely said that
as the decisions stand to-day they are very inconsistent in theory,
and .not altogether just in application. To appreciate fully the
nature of the problem it seems necessary to recall some funda-
mental conceptions as they have developed in the law of property.
Until comparatively recent time, man in his existence upon the
earth has been primarily concerned with its surface. Upon the
surface he lived, found or produced his food, and fought his ene-
mies. In his nomadic stages the earth and its fruits were no
doubt considered free, but as the wandering instinct gave way to
the desire for a fixed place of abode, and the individual, family,
or tribe, sought by force to control a particular part of the earth,
such control was- no doubt, both by reason and necessity, limited
to a dominion or control of the surface only. It must have been
at a later period, when the practice of mining and quarrying the
solid minerals of the earth had become common, that the maxim
"cuius est solum, cius est usque ad caelam ad inferos," was given
expression to, and the surface was presumed to be- the measure
*This article was published in the Dec., 1919. number of the Yale Law
Journal. It is re-published here by permission of the author and of the Yale
Law. Journal Co.
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and not the extent of man's dominion. This maxim that the owner
of the surface owns everything from the center of the earth to in-
finity above may, at the time of its conception, have been perfectly
true, but experience has taught that its qualification was nepes-
sary. It has been qualified by another maxim, "sic tere tuo ut
alienum -non laedas," so as to give a just and equitable right to the
landowner in respect to lateral support, light, air, and water on
the surface. When rights as to subterranean substances such as
water, oil and gas came before the courts for determination their
problem was to decide what qualification, if any, should be made
of this principle of absolute ownership.
Since underground waters and oil and gas are alike minerals
of fugitive and wandering nature, and since the question as to
water arose first, it seems not out of place to make brief mention
of the development of the law relative to that species of property.
It is to be noted that up to this time the law had dealt only with
substances of wandering nature as exist above the surface of the
earth, and as to these the qualification of the absolute ownership
doctrine had been such as practically to deny the idea of owner-
ship.
The landowner's right to underground percolating water is
said to have first arisen in the well known case of Acton v Blun-
dell.1 The plaintiff there brought an action for alleged interfer-
ence with water which was flowing underground to his spring by
the operation of a coal mine on adjoining land. The rules of law
governing surface streams were urged as a solution, but the court
refused so to hold and made the following statement, which has
been much cited and quoted as laying down the correct principle.'
"We think the present case, for reasons given above, is not to
be governed by the law which applies to rivers and flowing
1 (1843, Exch.) 12 M. & W. 324.
Chasemore v. Richards (1859) 7 HE. L. Cas. 349; Grand Junction Canal Co.
v. Shugar (1871) L. R. 6 Ch. App. 483; Wheatley v. Baugh (1855) 25 Pa. St.
528; Hanson v. McCue (1871) 42 Calif. 303; Frazier 1). Brown (1861) 12 Oh.
St. 294; New Albany & Salem R. R. 'v. Peterson (1860) 14 Ind. 112; city of
Greencastle v. Hazelett (1864) 23 Ind. 186; Ryan v. Quinlan (1912) 45 Mont.
521, 124 Pac. 512; 30 Am. & Eng. Cyc. (2d ed. 1905) 310ff.
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streams, but that it rather falls within that principle, which gives
to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his surface; that the land
immediately below his property, whether it is solid rock, or porous
ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part water; that the person
who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there
-found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that
if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off the
-water collected from underground springs in his neighbour's well,
this inconvenience to his neighbour falls within the description of
damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an
action. "'
Although this theory of absolute ownership as governing
rights of landowners in subterranean waters has been retained in
England and many of the states of this country, yet it has met
-with a dissatisfaction that has resulted in engrafting upon the
main principle several important exceptions. Perhaps the most
important of these qualifications are that the owner of land may
not intercept and use all of the water of an underground stream,
foully or maliciously divert percolating water, or appropriate such
water so as to injure a flowing stream. But these qualifications
of the absolute ownership theory were not sufficient to allay the
criticism of the rule. The Supreme Court. of New Hampshire in a
well reasoned case' attacked it as being unsound in theory and im-
practical in application and brought forth as a substitute the doc-
trine of correlative rights in percolating waters based on the
maxim, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas". This doctrine has
been favorably received in many states and the trend of the later
decisions is decidedly in that direction.
I Action v,. Blundell, supra, 353.
'See cases cited in 30 Am. & Bng. Cyc. (2d ed. 1905) 310ff.
"Bassett v. Salisbury Jo. (1862) 43 N. H. 569.
'Sweet v. Cutts (1870) 50 N. H. 439; Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903) 141 Calif.
116, 70 Pac. 663, 74 Pac. 766, 64 L. R. A. 236, note; Forbel v. City of Few Yor7.
(1900) 164 X. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644, 51 L. R. A. 695, note; Barclay v. Abraham
(1903) 121 Iowa, 619, 96 N. W. 1080; Stillwater Water Go. v. Farmer (1903)
89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W. 907, 60 L. R. A. 875, note; Erickson v. Croobston Water-
Works Co. (1908) 105 Minn. 182, 117 N. W. 435, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 650, note;
Meeker v. East Orange (1909, Ot. Err. & App.) 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 AtI. 379,
25 L. R. A. (Y. S.) 465, note; Pence v. Carney (1906) 58 W. Va. 296, 52 S. E.
702, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 266, note.
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The question of property in oil seems to have first arisen in a
Kentucky case decided in 1854.' Although Acton v. Blundef had
been decided some eleven years previous no mention was made of
that case. The defendant had taken three barrels of petroleum oil
from the well of the plaintiff and action was brought for its re-
covery. One of the questions necessary for the decision was
whether the oil, when taken, was a part of the freehold. Counsel
argued that the law applicable to surface streams of water should
govern and cited Blackstone, Kent and Bouvier's Institutes as
authority. But the court refused so to hold, saying that as the
owner of land had an exclusive property in water in a spring or
well on his land, as distinguished from flowing water, so should he
be considered
"the exclusive owner of oil, a peculiar liquid not necessary nor in-
deed suitable for the common use of man, and for reaching and ob-
taining which for its proper uses and for profit, he has constructed
a well with suitable fixtures."'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, realizing the inapplica-
bility of the absolute ownership doctrine, as applied to solid miner-
als, to oil and gas constructed a rule of property in these new min-
erals which has become the law in most of the states in this coun-
try.'
"Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by
themselves, if the analogy is not too fanciful, as minerals ferae
naturae. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals,
they have the power and the tendency to escape without the vo-
Hail v. Reed (1854) 54 Ky. 383.
'Ibid., 392.
9Westmoreland Gas Co. v. De Witt (1889) 130 Pa. St. 235, 18 AtL 724;
Hague v. Wheeler (1893) 157 Pa. St. 341, 27 Atl. 714; Jones v. Forest Oil Co.
(1900) 194 Pa. St. 379, 44 AtL 1074; Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co. (1907)
216 Pa. St. 362, 65 AtL 801; Poe 'v. Ulrey (1908) 233 IL 56, 84 N. E. 46;
People's Gas Co. v. Tyner (1892) 131 Ind. 277, 31 N. E. 59, 16 L. R. A. 443,
note; Murray v. Allred (1897) 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355; Isom v. Rex Crude
Oil Go. (1905) 147 Calif. 659, 82 Pac. 317; Hughes v. United Pipe Lines (1890)
119 N. Y. 423, 23 N. E. 1042; Williamson v. Jones (1894) 39 W. Va. 256, 19
S. E. 436, 25 L. R. A. 222, note; Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co. (1897) 57 Oh. St. 317,
49 N. E. 399;Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell (1909, C. C. E. D. 0kha.) 172
Fed. 545; Brown v. Spilman (1895) 155 U. S. 665, 15 Sup. Ct. 245; De Moss v.
Sample (1918) 143 La. 243, 78 So. 482.
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lition of the owner. Their 'fugitive and wandering existence
within the limits of a particular tract is uiacertain,' as said by
Chief Justice Agnew in Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 147, 148.
They belong to the owner of the land, and are a part of it, so long as
they are on or in it, and are subject to his control; but when
they escape, and go into other land, or come under another's con-
trol, the title of the former owner is gone. Possession of the land,
therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining,
or even a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so
that it comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer
yours, but his.""
A few years later the question was presented to the same court
as to whether an owner of land having a gas well thereon could
be restrained from allowing the gas to escape, thereby draining
the reservoir below so as to deplete the flow of the well of an ad-
joining owner. The court, following the logical application of the
absolute ownership doctrine, denied that the maxim "sic utere tuo
ut alienu 'non laedas" in any way affected the landowner's right
to take or use the gas. It is said that the owner's dominion is,
upon general principles, as absolute over the fluid as the solid
minerals."
In another case where the question was of the right of the
owner of an oil well to pump oil from his well regardless of injury
to his neighbor, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania apparently
realized that the absolute ownership doctrine in the sense of giving
an absolute right to take could not be applied, so they reverted to
the theory that "possession of the land is not necessarily posses-
sion of the oil and gas," and concluded "that the property of the
owner of the lands in oil and gas is not absolute until it is actually
within his grasp and brought to the surface."'
Thus far in the cases it is to be noted that the courts have
concerned themselves primarily with the owner's right to take the
oil and gas under his land and have held the right absolute upon
the principle of absolute ownership or some qualification of that
doctrine, .but they have not given serious consideration to the
' Westmoreland Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, supra, 249.
"Hague v. WheeZer, supra.
"Jones v. Forest Oil Co., supra, 383.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
rights of the adjoining landowner whose oil or gas is taken by the
operations of his neighbor. But in Barnard v. Monongatelaz Nat-
ural Gas Company, which was an action to prevent the owner of
land from drilling a well so close to the land of his neighbor as to
draw the oil therefrom, the court said-
"Every landowner or his lessee may locate his wells wherever he
pleases regardless of the interest of others. He may distribute
them over the whole farm or locate them only on one part of it.
He may crowd the adjoining farms so as to enable him to draw the
oil and gas from them. 'What then can the neighbor do ? Nothing,
only go and do likewise." The same rule has been adhered to in
Ohio.'
These cases, it is to be observed, adhere strictly to the doctrine
of absolute ownership in defining the rights of the owner of the
soil to take the oil and gas thereunder, and go farther than do
those courts which apply the absolute ownership doctrine to sub-
terranean water.u This rule is the law in a great majority of
American states,"' although waste of oil and gas underlying the
land has been prevented in some states by statute and in some by
judicial decision."
The opinions of the courts, particularly those of Pennsylvania,
have been thus referred to, for the purpose of showing some of the
developments of the law of oil and gas, and making clear if pos-
sible the influences which affectea the adoption of the theory of
absolute ownership as a basis of the rights of the landowner in
these substances. To construct and apply a, correct rule of prop-
erty governing these new and peouliar substances was no doubt a
puzzling one to the courts. One proposition seemed clear enough,
that is, that oil and gas were minerals,"s and as such a part of the
" Supra, 365.
"Kelleyj v. Ohio Oil Co., supra.
"See 64I,. R. A. 236, note; 30 Am. & Eng. Cyc. (2d ed. 1905) 310ff.
"Thornton, Oil and Gas (12d ed. 1918) secs. 18ff; also cases cited in note 9,
supra.
'Thornton, op. oit., sees. 30-35; Gillespie v. Fulton Oil Co. (1908) 236 Il.
188, 86 N. E. 219; Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Go. (1903) 117 Ky. 71,
77 S. W. 368; Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Go. (1900) 155 Lid. 461,
57 N. E. 912; Ohio Oil Co. v. Ividiana (1899) 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 585.
"Thornton, op. cit., see. 18.
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land." If minerals and a part of the land, they must, according to
all known principles of law, belong to the owner of the land by
some degree of ownership. The principle of absolute ownership
has been applied to minerals of solid nature such as coal and iron
and also to subterranean waters, another mineral of fugitive na-
ture, therefore, it was only natural for the courts to follow as far
as possible these analogies and precedents and make the principle
of absolute ownership the basis of property rights in oil and gas.
To do so, certain qualifications and exceptions were made so as to
fit the principle to the peculiar nature of the subject matter. This
struggle of the courts to make the cuius est solum doctrine ap-
plicable to oil and gas has resulted in producing rules of property
which it is believed are unsound in theory and unjust in applica-
tion.
The rule of absolute ownership when applied to solid mate-
rials of the earth is qualified by the maxim "sit ntere tuo ut
alienum non laedas," so that one may not use his own land so as
to injure his neighbor. On this theory it is settled law that the
owner of land has an easement of lateral support in the land of
his neighbor." For example, if a bank of gravel or sand is lo-
cated on the land of A and B, and A in removing gravel from his
land digs so close to the land of B as to cause B's gravel to fall
into A's land, B may recover in damages for the removal of the
gravel and still assert his title to the mineral removed. But sup-
pose, instead of taking gravel, A drills an oil or gas well on his
land with the result that he takes not only the gas from under his
land but also draws the oil and gas from under B's land. A seems
here to have done nothing more than remove the natural support
of B's oil and gas so as to cause it to flow in A's land. But the
courts in this latter instance not only refuse to give B a remedy
for the removal of natural support but go further and declare
that as soon as A gets the oil into his own land it is his and that
the entire act is damnum absque injarla. However inconsistent it
may seem, the courts have given two main reasons for refusing to
" Ibid., sec. 19.
"I Tiffany, Modern Law of Real Property (1903) see. 301.
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apply this principle of absolute ownership as applied to solid ma-
terials to oil and gas. These reasons are: first, because the owner
of land is an absolute owner and may take- all the oil and gas he
finds therein so long as he confines his operations to his own land;
and second, because oil and gas are fugitive and wandering in
their nature the same principles cannot be applied to them as are
applied to solid minerals without qualification. The first reason
is in application a peculiar one. B is refused a remedy against A
for the taking of the oil from under B's land because A is an ab-
solute owner of all the oil and gas under his land and has an abso-
lute right to take it. But is not B also an absolute owner? If
A's ownership must be protected by law so as to allow him to en-
joy it, must not B's ownership likewise be protected? A vital in-
cident of ownership is the protection given by law against inter-
ference by others. The inconsistency seems to be in declaring
that the owner of land is an absolute owner of the oil and gas
therein and using that principle as a basis to declare that he may
take all the oil and gas possible from his land regardless of the
effect upon the property of his neighbor and, on the other hand,
refusing to recognize that same principle in enforcing or protect-
ing the ownership of one whose oil or gas is taken. To put it
9hortly, the absolute ownership doctrine is used to make legal the
act of taking and is refused when a remedy for the taking is
asked. Such an application of the doctrine forms an anomalous
exception that destroys the principle itself, forms a rule violative
of the plainest principles of justice and equity, acknowledges the
weakness of the law to enforce defined rights of property, and
makes that relic of barbarism,
"The simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can,"
the basis of the law of property in oil and gas.
In support of this first reason for refusing the owner of land
a remedy against a neighbor who takes or injures his oil or gas
the courts have two supporting propositions based on the peculiar
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nature of oil and gas. The first is that it is difficult to tell with
exactness how close one landowner may drill a well to the land of
his neighbor and take oil or gas therefrom without also taking the
oil or gas from that neighbor's land, and if this could be deter-
mined, the quantity taken could not be proven with sufficient
certainty to form the foundation of an action. In other words
the remedy is denied because the extent of the wrong is difficult
of proof. It is not necessary that any law, the product of either
popular or judicial legislation, should prescribe the exact distance
within which an oil or gas well may be drilled to the land of an
adjoining owner. The law lays down no rule saying how close one
may excavate to the land of another, yet if such excavation is
made and the land of an adjoining owner is injured a remedy is
afforded for the wrong done. The taking of oil or gas from under
the land of another, like the removal of lateral support, is a ques-
tion of fact. If the courts insist on adhering to the principle of
absolute ownership, to be consistent they must compensate an in-
jury to that ownership and not deny it merely because it is diffi-
cult of proof. In many actions of damages the extent of the actual
damage is difficult of proof but the right of action is not denied
on this account. In oil and gas cases it is interesting to note if A
and B, adjoining owners of land, both lease to C for the purposes
of operating for oil and gas reserving a royalty in themselves,
and C drills for oil on the land of A so as to exhaust the land of
B, the courts recognize that B has been injured and allow him a
remedy in damages. It is true the right of B in this instance is
said to be based upon an implied contract in the lease that C will
honestly develop the lands so as to produce the most for B, but it
is to be observed that the measure of damages must be determined
by the amount of oil taken from B's land. As to proof of damages
in this sort of action the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
"The right of recovery being assumed, plaintiffs in error can-
not escape liability because the damages are difficult of exact as-
certainment. The nature of the inquiry here is such that it ii
practically impossible to ascertain with mathematical certainty
the exact amount of defendant in error's damages. This; however,
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affords no answer to a cause of action resulting from the breach
of contract or a duty imposed by law."'
The second subsidiary reason urged by the courts as an ex-
cuse for refusing a remedy to one whose oil and gas are taken by
the operations of his neighbor, on first impression, appears con-
trolling. Assuming that the owner of land is absolute owner of
the oil and gas therein with the consequent right to take, such
right could not be exercised at all, if such owner is to be ham-
pered by injuries to his neighbor's oil and gas, for these sub-
stances are of such nature that any taking from the land of one is
likely to injure his neighbor. If, therefore, one land owner had
the right to restrain his neighbor from drilling, it would be impos-
sible to develop oil and gas lands. But this argument does not
reconcile the fact that the owner of land is said to be the absolute
owner of oil and gas and yet 'is given no remedy if it is taken.
Such argument would seem on the other hand to show conclusive-
ly that the principle of absolute ownership is not the correct basis
of property rights in oil and gas for if strictly applied practically
every taking of these substances from the earth would give rise to
an action for damages.
The foregoing discussion leads up to the second main reason
why the courts have refused to apply the doctrine of absolute own-
ership as applied to solid minerals to oil and gas. If they at-
tempted such application they apparently realized the difficulty
pointed out above. Recognizing the peculiar nature of these sub-
stances and their power to move about beneath the surfacd of the
earth, they no doubt realized that if they applied the doctrine of
absolute ownership to allow one owner to take all beneath the sur-
face, to be consistent they must also apply such doctrine to give a
remedy to one whose oil and gas was taken, and that the result of
this would be that oil and gas lands could not be developed. Still
clinging to absolute ownership as a fundamental and controlling
doctrine the Pennsylvania court adopted a qualification to that
principle which was supposed to avoid the difficulties of the old
rule. Relying upon the analogy between oil and gas and animals
"Dauglwtee v. Ohio Oil ('o. (1914) 263 Ill. 518, 525, 105 N. E. 308.
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ferae naturae that court laid down the rule to be that oil and gas
belong to the owner of the land so long as they are in it but when
they escape and go into the land of another the former owner
loses all of his rights thereto.
This theory of absolute ownership as qualified by the Penn-
sylvania court establishes a rule which allows the oil and gas op-
erator great latitude in the development of oil lands. Under such
a rule he may take all of the oil and gas from under his own land
even though in so doing he may drain the oil and gas from the
land of his neighbors, and he may take by any means his ingen-
unity may provide, and use, sell, or waste the same, and as long
as he confines his surface operations to the ,boundaries of his own
land, whatever injury results to his neighbor is damnum abs que
injuria.= This result is arrived at by the court saying that the
taker has absolute ownership which must be protected by giving
this absolute right to take, and by further declaring that one
whose land is drained loses his ownership and right of property in
oil and gas in situ under the land as soon as it is taken. Such rule
or principle is produced by judicial legislation violative of the
simplest principles of the law of property.
There came a time, however, when it began to be realized that
the public had some interest in these great natural resources and
that some measure leading to conservation and prevention of
waste should be enacted. ,Such statutes were passed in some of the
states but were immediately met with the argument that since the
the owner of oil and gas lands was the absolute owner of these
substances, at least for the purpose of development, and that any
interference with his right to the use or production of these min-
erals was an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights. This
argument was probably first met and answered in an Indiana
case." Although the court pf that state had in a previous case'
depending upon the analogy of subterranean water, adopted the
Pennsylvania rule of absolute ownership, and held that an owner
of a gas well might "shoot" it. with nitroglycerin and thereby in-
"See cases cited in note 9, supra.
Townsend -v. State (1896) 147 Inds 624, N. E. 19.
People's Gas 0o. v. Tytner, " pra.
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crease its flow regardless of the alleged injury to his neighbor's
well, yet in this case, which was to try the constitutionality of a
statute to prevent the waste of gas by burning it in flambeau
lights, that court held the statute constitutional and not an inter-
ference with property rights. In arriving at such a conclusion
the analogy between oil And gas and animals fere naturae was
made use of. The court reasoned that the state could regulate the
use and consumption of these minerals of fugitive and wandering
iSature as they did that of animals, but the court did not in any
clear sense define its theory of the landowner's right of property in
oil and gas.
In a later Indiana case, State v. Ohio Oil Compzny, that
court, apparently realizing that the conclusion reached in the pre-
vious case could not stand together with the theory of absolute own-
ership as adopted in earlier decisions, repudiated the theory of ab-
solute ownership and presented a new one. The court discussed the
absolute ownership doctrine and then its own adoption of the theory
that oil and gas were like animals, ferae naturae and concluded:
"We therefore hold that the title to natural gas does not vest in any
private owner until it is reduced to actual possession, and therefore
that the act from which we have quoted is not violative of the con-
stitution, as an unwarranted interference with private property."'
This theory of property in oil and gas may be scrutinized from
many viewpoints all of which are interesting. There is no doubt that
it produces a theory upon which the state can regulate the waste of
these natural resources without violation of property rights of the
landowner. From that standpoint it is no doubt an improvement
over the Pennsylvania rule. From the standpoint of the adjoining
owner no different result is reached. Since the owner of the land
has no property in the oil or gas in or under his land, none of his
property rights can be violated by the operations of his neighbor.
(1897) 150 Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 809.
2 State -v. Ohio Oil Go., supra, 32, citing Townsend v. State, supra, and Peo-
ple's Gas Co. v. TPyner, supra. The same rule has apparently been adopted as to
oil.
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The only difference as to this point then between the Indiana rule
and Pennsylvania rule is one of theory; the former denies any right
of property in one whose oil or gas is taken, while the latter, as
pointed out, defines a property right, but fails to protect it. There
is no question but that in its zeal to protect the interest the Indiana
court greatly overworked the analogy between gas and wild animals.
As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out in the ap-
peal of this same case, there is an analogy between gas and wild an-
imals but not an identity.' Property in wild animals is in the
public, with a right in the owner of the land to reduce to possession
in accordance with the regulations and expressions of the public
will, and therefore any regulation of their use would not be in vio-
lation of rights of property. But oil and gas are not property of
the public it must at once be conceded. The Indiana court says
ownership is not in the landowner. This statement was too strong
and had to be qualified later when a life tenant made the defence to
an action for waste by saying that since the remainder-man had no
property in the oil and gas and that his own act of mining these
substances was not waste.' The court then said that the landowner
did have a property right in oil and gas in the sense that he had an
exclusive right to take these substances.
The Supreme Court of the United States in upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Indiana statute, without adopting either the In-
diana or the Pennsylvania theory of property in oil and gas,pointed
out the dilemma which was involved in any argument against the
statute:
"If the right of the collective owners of the surface to take from
the common fund, and thus reduce a portion of it to possession, does
not create a property interest in the common fund, then the statute
does not provide for the taking of privatt property without compen-
sation. If, on the other hand, there be, as a consequence of the
right of the surface owners to reduce to po&-ession, a right of prop-
erty in them, in and to the substances contained in the common res-
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra.
" Richmond National Gas Co. v. Davenport (1905) 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N. E.
525; Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co. (1911) 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 225. See also Manu-
facturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Jo., supra, where it was admitted that a land-
owner does have a property right in oil and gas in situ under his land.
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ervoir of supply, then as a necessary result of the right of property,
its indivisible quality and the peculiar position of the things to which
it relates, there must arise the legislative power to protect the right
of property from destruction.''
Shortly after this decision the Indiana court was presented with
the question as to whether an owner of oil and gas lands could pre-
vent hiis neighbor from using artificial means to increase the flow of
gas wells to the alleged injury of the plaintiff's wells.' In this case
the couirt goes to great length of argument and explanation to evade
its former decisions. The absolute ownership doctrine as applied to
percolating water in earlier cases is repudiated, and the ferae na-
turae analogy from which the theory was produced that there was
no property in oil and gas in.the landowner is likewise receded from.
The court apparently adopted the theory suggested by the
United States Supreme Court that the owners of oil and gas lands
are common owners of the oil and gas beneath, that every owner
should exercise his right to take in such manner as not to destroy the
common source and that to prevent such destruction, independently
of statute, the common owners of the gas in the common reservoir,
have the right to enjoin any and all acts of another owner which will
materially injure, or which will involve the destruction of, the prop-
erty in the common fund, or supply of gas.
This theory is adopted by a line of Kentucky cases.' In Louis-
ville Gas Company v. Kentucky Heating Company, which was an
action by one owner of gas wells to prevent waste by another, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals made this statement:
"Every owner may bore for gas on his own ground, and may make a
reasonable use of it; but he may not wantonly injure or destroy the
reservoir common to him and his neighbor. This principle has been
often applied. Thus each riparian owner may make'a reasonable
use of a lake or stream of water flowing through his land, but he can
not make an unreasonable use of it. Every traveler may make a
I Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra, 210.
"Manufacturers" Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., supra.
' Louiaville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (1903) supra; Commonwealth
v. Trent (1903) 117 Ky. 34, 77 S. W. 390; Hamby v. City of Dawson Springs
(1907) 126 Ky. 451, 104 S. W. 259, 12 L. P, A. (1T. S.) 1164, note; Louisville
Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Go. (1909) 132 Ky. 435, 1m S. W. 374.
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reasonable use of a highway, but not an unreasonable use to the det-
riment of another. No one may make an unreasonable use of the
atmosphere. In all these instances the party aggrieved by the un-
reasonable use may maintain an action for redress. In the case be-
fore us the plaintiff and the defendant have each the right to take
gas from the common source of supply, but neither may by waste,
destroy the rights of the other; and, as in the case of other like
wrongs, the action for redress may be brought in the name of the
real party in interest.'"
In a later case the same court said :'
"The right of the surface owners to take gas from the subjacent
fields or reservoirs is a right in common. There is no property in the
gas until it is taken. Before it is taken it is fugitive in its nature,
and belong in common to the owners of the surface. The right of
the owners to take it is without stint; the only limitation being that
it must be taken for a lawful purpose and in a reasonable manner.
Each tenant in common is restricted to a reasonable use of this
right, and each is entitled to the natural flow of the gas from the sub-
jacent fields, and any unlawful exercise of this right, by any tenant
in common, which results in injury to the natural right of any other
tenant or surface owner, is an actionable wrong."
From these last mentioned cases it is clear that the courts of In-
diana and Kentucky have advanced a theory, not new in its applica-
tion to other substances but new in its application to oil and gas.
The Indiana court has receded from that extreme viewpoint assumed
in Ohio Oil Company v. State, that the landowner has no property
whatever in oil and gas under his land, and the Kentucky court has
repudiated their former view that the owner of the land is the abso-
lute owner of these substances which underlie his land, and they
have met on the common theory, each relying upon the analogy of
oil and gas to air and water above the surface and the modern doc-
trine of percolating waters, that the owner of the land does have a
property in the oil and gas underlying in that he has an exclusive
right to take, but that such' property right is qualified by the prin-
ciple that the right must be so exercised as not to injure other land-
"Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (1903) supra, 78.
' Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (1909) supra.
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owners who also have a right to take from the common reservoir.
Whether or not a given act of one landowner or his lessee is violative
of the rights of his neighbor is wholly dependent upon whether such
act or omission is a reasonable use of that right.
The objection to the doctrine of absolute ownership, and the
qualifications of that theory have already been pointed out. The
unsoundness of the Indiana theory that the landowner has no prop-
erty whatever in the oil and gas under his land has likewise been
made clear. It now remains to determine if possible, if this middle
view of qualified owner is sound in theory and just and possible of
application.
It seems needless to contend longer that oil and gas are not
minerals and when in. situ in or under the land a part thereof and
that the owner of the surface has a right to use for himself or trans-
fer property in these substances to others as separate from the land.
Nor is it possible to evade the possibility that froni the peculiar na-
ture of these fugitive and wandering substances, that every taking
of oil and gas by one landowner from his own land in the exercise
of this right may affect the oil under the land of his neighbors But
should the owner of oil and gas lands be wholly deprived of this
right to take because another may be injured, or should the right of
the taker as the Pennsylvania rule provides be absolute and the
rights of others be subservient to him? But this doctrine of quali-
fied ownership avoids all of these inconsistencies and provides that
each owner has a right to take and that any taking is permissible
which does not unreasonably injure his neighbor. The sole ground
of the qualification of the landowner's right to oil and gas is the
similar rights of others and the extent of the qualification is deter-
mined by the reasonable use of the right. Since the right of each
landowner is similar, and his enjoyment thereof dependent upon the
action of the neighboring landowners, these rights must be valueless
unless exercised with reference to each other. The maxim "sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas," therefore applies, and as in the case of
water, restricts each to a reasonable exercise of his own right, a
reasonable use of his own property, in view of the similar rights of
others.
Property in Oil and Gas
'When the doctrine of reasonable use based on the correlative
rights of the adjoining owners of the surface has been suggested as
being the correct theory of the law of property in oil and gas, the
objection has been raised that there is such difference in the nature
of underground water on the one hand and oil and gas on the other
that the same theory cannot be applied to both. This objection, it is
believed, has been made without a clear understanding of the prob-
lem involved and is without foundation in reason. It is true the
courts have generally declared that water is necessary for the use,
enjoyment and improvement of lands, particularly where they are
used for agricultural purposes, and that without it, life could not
be sustained. That if the landowner is deprived of its use his land is
destroyed, and this has been urged as a strong reason for the doc-
trine of reasonable user of percolating water. It has been repeated-
ly declared that any use of water for the purpose of the enjoyment
or improvement of the land is reasonable, but that wasting or car-
rying away the water for commercial purposes is unreasonable if it
injures the adjoining owner. And it must also be immediately rec-
ognized and admitted that oil and gas are not necessary for agri-
cultural purposes or necessary for the common use of man, and that
the sole purpose of its production is for sale and manufacture which
necessitates its removal from the vicinity of the land. But these
things are not controlling. Both of these substances are things of
value. To deprive a man of water under his land deprives him of
an indirect profit to be realized out of the soil, but to remove the oil
and gas from another's land, may in many instances deprive him of
the entire value of the land. Because the tests of reasonableness of
use of these different classes of property are not the same, is not a
sound reason that the same theory of property should not govern
both. The fundamental reason after all why the doctrine of cor-
relative rights is the proper rule of property governing them is be-
cause of their fugitive and wandering nature beneath the surface of
the earth in liquid or gaseous form so that any taking by one may
have some effects on the presence of these things under the land of
another.
The Indiana and Kentucky courts have not gone very far in the
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application of this doctrine of correlative rights in oil and gas. In
fact none of the decided cases have been concerned with oil, but the
foundation is laid and there only remains the application. But wi
this theory prove more just and more sound in determining the
rights of adjoining owners than the Pennsylvania doctrine? In the
first place it does not deceive the landowner by telling him that he
has an absolute right of ownership in the oil and gas under his land
and then refuse him any remedy when another takes it. It informs
him that he has a property in the oil and gas under his land and
that he has a right to take it and use it, but that in exercising this
right he must so act as not to unreasonably injure his neighbor.
Such a rule has already provided a remedy against waste or a ma-
licious sapping of the earth of the gas therein contained." It has
likewise declared that the use of powerful pumps drawing the gas
from under the land of the adjoining owner is an injury which may
be enjoined.' What then is to prevent this rule from being ap-
plied to prevent one owner from placing wells near his boundary so
as to sap the land of his neighbor of the oil and gas therein con-
tained? It merely remains for the court to determine in each indi-
vidual case whether this exercise of the right to take is reasonable.
The question of reasonableness is a mixed questin of law and fact.
There seems to be no reason why the remedy sifould not be either in
equity by injunction or in damages at law.
"Louiwsville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (1903) supra.
'Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., supra.
